Abstract: The internal reporting reward mechanism for food safety risks in China is grounded in principle-level legal provisions, but its concrete implementation must rely on lower-level laws with explicit legal requirements and effects. To better protect public health, the state has introduced this mechanism within food safety regulation; however, its enforcement leaves wide room for administrative discretion and may easily encroach upon labor rights and business freedom. Accordingly, the mechanism can only be activated under specific conditions, namely when the reporter is a natural person providing information on potential violations, does so voluntarily, supplies original information, substantially contributes to the enforcement process, and the case involves an appropriate penalty amount. The implementation of internal reporting rewards should balance reporting channels, standardize reward distribution, and incorporate post-event evaluation and adjustment based on practical outcomes to enhance the incentive effect. In the event of disputes over reward decisions, differentiated standards of judicial review should be established—strict scrutiny applied to whether the administrative authority has fulfilled its duty to grant a reward, and more deferential scrutiny applied to the method and amount of the reward.

Key words: food safety, the internal reporting reward, whistleblower, collaborative regulation, social supervision