食品科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 47 ›› Issue (19): 397-410.doi: 10.7506/spkx1002-6630-20260706-043

• 专题论述 • 上一篇    

农产品批发市场食品安全关键节点治理

李方圆,冀玮   

  1. (1.安徽理工大学马克思主义学院,安徽 淮南 232001;2.对外经济贸易大学政府管理学院,北京 100029)
  • 发布日期:2026-10-22
  • 基金资助:
    安徽理工大学高层次引进人才科研启动基金项目(2025yjrc0111);国家粮食和物资储备局软科学课题项目(GLRKX2026081);国家市场监督管理总局发展研究中心2026年度重大项目(ZD202626)

Food Safety Governance at Key Nodes in Agricultural Products Wholesale Markets

LI Fangyuan, JI Wei   

  1. (1. School of Marxism, Anhui University of Science and Technology, Huainan 232001, China; 2. School of Government, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China)
  • Published:2026-10-22

摘要: 农产品批发市场作为我国农产品流通的核心枢纽,承担着我国约70%农产品的分销任务,食品安全治理直接关系到居民“舌尖上的安全”与社会公共卫生稳定。系统综述我国农产品批发市场食品安全治理的研究进展,剖析当前“产地准出”与“市场准入”脱节、冷链断链频发、传统行政监管边际效应递减等痛点。引入危害分析与关键控制点理论,将传统工业控制参数转化为流通契约行为与物理环境指标,识别入场查验、快速检测、冷链仓储及追溯公示4 类关键控制点,构建“政府监管、市场首责、商户自律、公众及第三方参与”的多主体协同共治运行机理与博弈框架。通过博弈论模型分析依法实施信用约束和风险信息公示对商户遵规行为的影响。结合法国巴黎朗吉斯等国际治理模式及深圳海吉星等国内实践模式,提出基于动态信用评级的激励相容矩阵和按品类风险、市场规模、设施能力分级分类、分步实施的方案,以兼顾执行成本与落地条件,为农产品批发市场食品安全监管走向系统善治提供理论支撑与决策参考。

关键词: 农产品批发市场;食品安全监管;危害分析与关键控制点;协同治理;博弈模型

Abstract: As the core hub of agricultural product distribution in China, agricultural wholesale markets handle about 70% of the country’s agricultural products. Food safety governance is directly related to the “safety on the tip of the tongue” of residents and public health stability. This systematic review examines recent research on food safety governance in Chinese agricultural wholesale markets and identifies current challenges including the disconnect between production exit standards and market entry requirements, frequent disruptions in cold-chain logistics, and the diminishing marginal effects of traditional administrative oversight. Applying the principles of hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP), this study translates conventional industrial control parameters into indicators of distribution conduct and physical conditions, identifying four critical control points: entry inspection, rapid testing, cold-chain storage, and traceability disclosure. It develops a collaborative governance framework involving government regulation, market accountability, merchant self-discipline, and participation of the public and third parties. A game-theoretic model is used to examine how lawful credit constraints and risk information disclosure may affect merchant compliance. Drawing on the governance model of the Rungis market in Paris and that of the Haijixing market in Shenzhen, this study proposes an incentive-compatible matrix based on dynamic credit rating and a phased implementation strategy for classification and grading based on category-specific risks, market scale, and facility capacity to balance governance effectiveness, compliance costs, and feasibility, providing theoretical support and decision-making references for achieving systematic good governance of food safety in agricultural wholesale markets.

Key words: agricultural products wholesale market; food safety regulation; hazard analysis and critical control points; collaborative governance; game-theoretic model

中图分类号: